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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
THE BIOFUEL CONTROVERSY
Summary
About a decade ago, the main OECD countries decided to promote the use of biofuels so as to
reduce greenhouse gases, to contribute to energy self-sufficiency and to create additional demand
for agricultural commodities. The introduction of mandatory blending requirements and lavish
subsidies spurred fast adoption of this technology. In the course of 2008, the already existing
controversy about the effectiveness of this strategy culminated as the resulting upward shift in
demand contributed to staggering rises in food prices on world markets. It is uncertain as yet
whether this will tone done current ambitions among policy makers to expand biofuel produc-
tion. The paper shows that high ratios of energy prices to food prices are needed to make bio-
fuel production profitable without the mandatory blending and subsidies. Yet, even if food-based
biofuels disappeared, the issue remains that rising high energy prices will promote intensified use
worldwide of land for energy crops, requiring huge amounts of mineral fertilizers and putting
nature under additional pressure. In policy terms, this defines three major tasks. The first is
replacing the current excise taxes on energy carriers by a uniform carbon tax, so as to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions in an efficient manner, the second to prevent price fluctuations on the
oil markets from destabilizing food markets, as happened in recent years. Introduction of upper
limits on the use of food for biofuel could prove effective here. The third, much wider, task is to
make the transition to a partly biomass based energy production possible and sustainable, that is
establishing fair distribution of property and user rights over the lands, while safeguarding bio-
diversity and soil fertility and maintaining adequate labour standards and living conditions, also
during periods that these become non-profitable following a drop in energy prices.
Key words: Biofuels, carbon tax, fuel blending requirements, greenhouse gases, natural resource
management
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid rise in food and energy prices that started in 2007 persisted into
2008, and so did the debate on its causes and consequences. Biofuels figured
prominently among the causes of what soon was referred to as a food crisis
(IFPRI 2008; FAO 2008; Ivanic and Martin 2008; Keyzer et al. 2008), and the
policies in the EU and the US to promote their use were specifically blamed
(Mitchell 2008; OECD 2008; Rosegrant 2008; Tangermann 2008).
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Biofuels are liquid fuels for use in transport. They take the form of
bioethanol from cereals, sugar beet or cane, and of biodiesel from vegetable
oil. They can substitute for and be blended with fossil fuel based gasoline and
diesel, respectively, and in low concentration be used in regular combustion
engines of cars and trucks, and hence be distributed by oil companies relying
on existing infrastructure. They can also increase the octane number of gaso-
line, and car manufacturers have designed engines to be marketed (e.g. see
Nevis 2008) that promise to increase significantly the fuel efficiency of com-
bustion. In anticipation of these developments, some countries, particularly
those with little hydropower and a major domestic car manufacturing indus-
try, will be inclined to bet that such flexible fuel vehicles are the future win-
ners in the contest for the preferred type of combustion. Current experiments
with biofuels prepare for this transition.
Biofuels can reduce import dependence on fossil fuels as well as mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions, where their use is in principle CO2-neutral, since
all carbon emitted after combustion in the vehicle was previously sequestered
by the crop. As prices of fossil fuels keep on rising, while supplies of OECD
countries increasingly originate from less than secure suppliers, the import
dependency argument has gained weight, especially for oil.
Furthermore, the crops used as feedstocks can be tilled and harvested
with proven technology, and the conversion processes (fermentation to make
ethanol and esterification to make biodiesel) are well developed and opera-
tional at commercial scale. Finally, use of food crops for biofuel until recently
offered a welcome outlet for agricultural products whose prices had been in
a deep glut for quite some time but now with rising food prices doubts have
been emerging and various objections that were already raised much earlier
have gained prominence.
First, biofuels can only contribute a modest fraction to the overall energy
needs in transport, beyond which they would push food production beyond
its limits, particularly at a time that income growth and urbanization in
Asia lead to fast rising demand for meat and animal feeds. Even the cur-
rent percentage-wise relatively low levels of biofuel use in transport create
major pressure on food markets, witness the present crisis. This pressure
would be attenuated if biofuels were obtained from crops grown on land not
suitable for food crops and if a greater part of the plant was usable for it.
However, progress has been remarkably slow in realizing this so-called sec-
ond generation technology, particularly because it proves difficult to scale
up to industrial level the digestion of cellulose membranes by ruminants.
Breakthroughs have been announced repeatedly but have not yet entered the
commercial phase (Sims et al. 2007; Royal Society 2008) and even the most
optimistic predictions (OECD 2008) do not expect introduction before 2012.
Second, detailed studies point out that in practice the production of bio-
fuels requires a considerable amount of fossil fuel inputs along all steps of
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the processing and transport chain, thus putting to question the environmen-
tal benefits and by the same token the import dependence argument that with
a wide range of variation estimates a fossil fuel need of about one third of
the biofuel produced (see OECD 2008 and Von Blottnitz and Curran 2007
for summaries).
Third, biofuel crops need nitrogen fertilizers that cause increased emissions
of NO2, which is a greenhouse gas many times stronger in effect than CO2. In
addition, the burning and fallow resulting from land clearing for new biofuel
plantations may cause enormous levels of emission. All this might nullify any
savings on CO2 emissions from fossil fuels (Crutzen et al. 2007).
Fourth, as the strong demand for biofuel crops has already triggered land
use changes world wide, threatening biodiversity, the call for enforcing sus-
tainability criteria and for certification is getting stronger (WWF 2007; WWI
2006).
Finally, in virtually all countries except Brazil biofuel production is far
from profitable and fully relies on sizeable subsidies and quantitative restric-
tions in the form of minimum blending requirements that, moreover, make
biofuel demand highly price inelastic hence contributing to price instability on
food markets, to increasing malnutrition, and to inflation.
Thus, biofuels have become object of major controversy. In the heat of the
debate the use of food as fuel was denounced as unethical (OXFAM 2008),
an accusation that could be readily refuted by pointing out that use of non-
renewables such as fossil fuels is possibly more unethical, and that agricultural
and forestry products have always been used as fuel, in lighting and heating.
In fact, biofuel was used in transport before fossil fuel. The first Diesel engine
developed in 1898 ran on peanut oil; the famous T-Ford, introduced in 1908
ran on ethanol, and in the 1920s, 25% of oil sales were non-petroleum related.
It was only to disappear in the late 1940s.
In our view, besides the doubts expressed about the significance of the con-
tribution to carbon sequestration and to reduced import dependence, the key
objection should be about the brute non-market means through which a new
price inelastic demand category is made to force its way into agricultural mar-
kets.
At the same time, it would be an oversimplification to attribute all blame
of the vagaries on food markets to biofuels, since this would neglect other
factors such as speculation and rising demand for meat and animal feeds in
Asia. Moreover, even in the absence of biofuels, the rising prices of energy
would put food markets under pressure, via the competition for land between
food and energy uses. After stopping all production of liquid biofuel as
bioethanol and biodiesel from food crops (generation one) and from residues,
wood and grasses (generation two), there would always remain a “genera-
tion zero” biomass demand in the form of firewood, charcoal, dung and crop
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residues that has served as fuel for cooking and heating ever since mankind
lighted its first fire.
In the remainder of this communication we provide further background
on this biofuel controversy. Our main assertion will be that rather than the
issue of biofuel use itself, rising scarcity of fossil fuels leading to increased
use of land for energy is the central issue that has to be addressed with bet-
ter policy instruments than those currently activated in promotion of biofuels.
Section 2 describes the current role of biofuels within the energy sector and
envisages the impact of existing plans in the EU and the US to expand this
sector. Section 3 provides an estimate of the implicit subsidy corresponding to
the mandatory blending requirements for biodiesel in the EU. Section 4 con-
siders major policy implications: replacing excise on energy by a carbon tax,
implementing caps on biofuel use to help stabilizing world food prices, and
finally the more open question of assuring sustainable production of biomass
for both food and energy use. Section 5 concludes.
2 ROLE AND IMPACT WITHIN THE ENERGY AND AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
As shown in Table 1, conventional fossil fuels (gas, oil and coal) are still by
far the major source of energy in the world, accounting for about 80% of the
total. Next come nuclear energy and a range of renewables, primarily biomass
in its traditional form as firewood, the major energy source in many devel-
oping countries. The transport sector uses about 20% of total energy, while
industry and residents, in equal shares, consume about 40% each. Currently,
biofuels contribute close to 1% of the world’s energy use in transport, and are
mainly used in the OECD countries and in Brazil.
TABLE 1 – WORLD DEMAND FOR PRIMARY ENERGY, AND CONSUMPTION OF
ENERGY FOR TRANSPORT AND BIOFUELS, BY REGION, 2005, (EJ)
OECD
countries
India and
China
Other
developing
countries
Transition
countries
World, total
Total energy demand 231.0 95.0 98.2 45.0 469.2
Gas, oil, coal 191.2 76.2 70.6 40.1 378.2
Nuclear 25.5 0.8 0.8 3.0 30.1
Hydro, renewables 14.3 18.0 26.8 1.8 60.9
Energy for transport 52.3 6.6 21.3 3.8 84.1
Liquid biofuels 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.8
Note: 1EJ (=exajoule) = 1018 Joules. Source: World Energy Outlook, 2007, p. 592ff, International
Energy Agency, Paris.
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The International Energy Agency projects total energy demand in 2030 to
increase by 50% relative to 2005, and still to be originating mainly from gas,
oil and coal. Renewable energy is expected to double in size, and biofuel use
to increase fourfold, but their shares in total remain small, nonetheless. Thus,
irrespective of biofuel policies, the role of renewable energy is taken to remain
modest.
The contribution that agriculture could potentially make to energy supply
for the transport sector is constrained by the fundamental observation that
the energy obtained from a hectare of a typical biofuel crop, say rapeseed in
the EU, is equivalent to about 6–7 barrels of oil per year, while the world con-
sumes 85million barrels/day. Ethanol in Brazil made from sugar cane under
the most favorable conditions yields about 40 barrels/ha, but marginal lands
suitable for biofuel will deliver at most 2–3 barrels/ha. Thus, there is no ques-
tion that land availability puts a severe limit on the use of biofuel worldwide
(Royal Society 2008). We briefly review policies pursued by the EU and US
in this respect, and consider the prospects for increased biofuel production in
other parts of the world.
The US implements its biofuel program through two types of subsidies.
One is its general support to corn, bioethanol’s major feedstock, the other
a subsidy of about 0.50 USD/gal to bioethanol processors, while ethanol
imports from Brazil are prevented through tariffs. In 2007, ambitious legis-
lation was enacted (EISA, the Energy Independence and Security Act), to
expand existing ethanol production, and to promote biodiesel production
(mainly from soybeans) as well as ethanol of cellulosic origin, for which ade-
quate technologies need to be developed. The EISA-targets are ambitious: by
2022 this program is supposed to deliver 36 billion gals of biofuels (approxi-
mately 12% of current US demand for transport fuel). Table 2 estimates the
impact of the program on agricultural land use in the US, assuming that
additional demand is met from domestic corn and soybean production with
existing farm and biofuel technology.
The table confirms that impact on land use will be substantial, especially
for the biodiesel program. Since total harvested arable land consists for 50%
of corn and soybeans, major reallocations in cropping patterns would be nec-
essary, which since the US is exporter in both crops and a major one in corn,
would significantly affect world markets, and far more than was already the
case.
The EU on its part adopted in 2003 a directive (Directive 2003/30/EC) sta-
ting that member states should set mandatory minimum blending shares of
biofuels in their gasoline and diesel use for transport fuel, starting from 2%
in 2003 to reach 5.75% in 2010. The directive provides separate minimum tar-
gets for both gasoline, to rely on bioethanol, and diesel, to use biodiesel. Con-
sequently, wheat and sugar beet are increasingly used for bioethanol, while
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TABLE 2 – LAND USE FOR BIOFUELS IN THE US, CURRENT AND TARGETED
EISA targets
2005 2007 2010 2022
Corn area (million ha) 30.4 34.8
Corn land for ethanol (million ha) 4.4 8.5 11.3 14.2
(% of corn land) 14.4 24.3 32.5 40.7
Soybeans area (million ha) 28.9 25.4
Soybeans area for biodiesel (million ha) 0.6 3.6 4.1 31.7
(% of soyland) 2.1 14.3 16.2 124.8
Note: EISA targets used here are 12 billion gallons ethanol and 0.65 billion gallons biodiesel in
2010 and 15 billion gallons ethanol and 5 billion gallons biodiesel in 2022, while the overall target
is 36 billion gallons. For 2010 and 2020 %-areas are relative to the 2007 surface, hence a figure
exceeding 100% for soybeans in 2022.
TABLE 3 – LAND USE FOR BIOFUELS, EU-27, CURRENT AND TARGETED
EU targets
2005 2007 2010 2020
Cereals area (million ha) 61.2 58.7
Cereal area for ethanol (million ha) 0.3 0.5 2.6 4.9
(% of cereals land) 0.5 0.9 4.4 8.3
Sugarbeet area (million ha) 2.2 2.3
Sugarbeet area for ethanol (million ha) 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4
(% of sugarbeet land) 1.3 2.0 10.1 19.2
Oilseeds area (million ha) 9.5 9.8
Oilseeds area for biodiesel (million ha) 2.6 4.9 10.3 19.6
(% of oilseed land) 27.5 49.6 104.6 200.2
Note: EU targets are 5.75% of transport fuel in 2010 and 10% in 2020. The 2007 crop areas
have been maintained to compute %-area in 2010 and 2020, hence the figures exceeding 100% for
oilseed land.
rapeseed enters biodiesel production. Table 3 shows estimated current and
future land use, based on the targets.
The tables show that the targets for oilseed crops are particularly
challenging, due to the relatively low energy yields of these crops. The EU tar-
get of 10% of transport fuel from biofuel, slightly less ambitious than the US
target in 2022, would already take some 15% of its total arable land.
With one third of the world’s total ethanol production Brazil is the second
largest producer, slightly behind the US, and the world’s largest exporter. Its
ethanol program started 30 years ago, using sugar cane as feedstock, and the
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residual cane-waste (bagasse) for process heat and power. Using state-of-the
art technology, ethanol from sugar cane already becomes competitive when
the oil price exceeds 40 USD per barrel (for reference, the 2008 peak in June
of 2008 was around 145 USD). Furthermore, the production process is close
to CO2 neutral, because virtually all inputs are of vegetable or biofuel origin
themselves.
Brazilian government imposes a mandatory blending of 25% of ethanol
with gasoline, which can now be used by all regular gasoline vehicles. Current
fuel prices strongly promote ethanol use and a quarter of the Brazilian car
fleet now consists of flexible-fuel vehicles, which can run on any proportion
of gasoline and ethanol. Consequently, ethanol fuel achieves a 50% market
share of fuel consumption of the gasoline-powered fleet in 2008. The ethanol
program has not always been as successful. Subsidies were needed in the
initial years to kick-start the program and in the early nineties when fossil
fuel prices were low, the program slumped and the production of cars fit for
ethanol came to a standstill.
Nowadays Brazil is widely believed to be the lowest cost producer of
ethanol, and the combined ethanol-sugar facilities even produce a net surplus
of electricity. According to OECD (2008) the margin between the gasoline
price and net production costs of ethanol (energy, processing and feedstock
costs minus the value of joint products) is positive for all the years 2004–’07,
raising to some 0.30 USD per liter of gasoline equivalent in 2007.
Several other countries have the potential to become significant bio-
fuel producers, but each is facing specific constraints. Ukraine and Rus-
sia currently avail of fertile land that is underutilized due to labor and
management shortages and poor export opportunities. Commercial biofuel
production with high input levels of fertilizer and pesticides and increased
mechanization is currently being considered to supply export crops that would
not have to meet the safety standards applying to food. Yet, this advantage
would seem to apply for a transitory period only, and gradually food produc-
tion is likely to become more profitable, particularly if developed countries,
the EU in particular, liberalize their agricultural imports, while imposing sus-
tainability criteria on them.
Tropical countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Columbia
have increased their palm oil production by about 10% per year since 2000, in
response to world-wide demand. They now supply about 90% of world palm
oil that contributes about a quarter of vegetable oil production. Commercial
palm tree plantations can produce up to three times as much oil per hectare
as rapeseed but the growth in production has been severely criticized because
it encroaches on forest land, at the expense of biodiversity and, particularly
on peat soils, with large emissions of carbon (Fargione et al. 2008).
China over the years 2003–2005 also stepped up its biofuel production,
largely from food stocks that built up in the 1990s after years of good crops
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and limited opportunities for exports, These stocks had become unsuitable for
human consumption. In 2007, however, as these stocks had been processed,
and world food prices started rising steeply worldwide, it imposed a ban on
the use of maize for this purpose, signaling mounting concerns about compe-
tition with food.
Finally, prospects for Jatropha, a bush-like oil producing shrub, have been
reported on frequently, in particular because this can grow on road sides and
marginal lands with low inputs. However, under such circumstances its yields
are low as well, and harvesting of the fruits becomes labor intensive. It would
seem that this shrub is best suited for local use, in combination with other
purposes such as fencing and as part of land conservation schemes, and can
substitute for purchased fuel (Jongschaap et al. 2007).
3 IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES ON BIOFUELS IN THE EU
Countries implement their biofuel targets in different ways; see OECD 2008;
USDA/FAS 2008 for an overview. As mentioned above, the EU increas-
ingly opts for imposing minimum blending percentages of biofuels in total
fuel. This is obviously motivated by the consideration that use of biofuel is
not profitable and needs subsidization. Blending requirements are quantita-
tive restrictions that oblige fuel producers to purchase biofuels at prices that
exceed the equivalent fossil fuel price, generating implicit cross subsidies while
avoiding public spending.
To highlight the significance of this subsidy and its sensitivity to changes in
prices of food and fossil fuel, we look further into the case of biodiesel in the
EU. We estimate production cost of biofuel under input-output assumptions
with biodiesel made from rapeseed oil as raw material, using fossil fuel for the
crushing of oil from rapeseed, the conversion of vegetable oil into biodiesel
and for distribution, as well as factor inputs (labor and capital) for processing
and transportation.
For simplicity, our calculation assumes that all biofuel would be obtained
from biodiesel, disregarding bioethanol, which is somewhat more efficient but
only plays a minor role in the EU at present. Biofuel and fossil fuel input are
expressed in liters of the same energy unit, correcting for differences in caloric
content. This makes it possible at constant factor input costs to compute the
biofuel cost as a linear function of the raw material price of food.
This is shown in Figure 1 as the straight line, with factor costs of 35
eurocts/l as intercept, and a net conversion factor of 1.3 measuring ineffi-
ciency in energy use as slope, which amounts to a 0.30 l energy fuel to pro-
duce 1 l of biofuel. The calculation follows the detailed life cycle analysis in
Elsayed et al. (2003) that compares well with the six other studies surveyed
in Frondel and Peters (2007). For reference, the total chain, covering biofuel
production from rapeseed as well as cultivation and harvesting of the crop,
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Figure 1 – Biodiesel parity price and price observations for 2003, 2007, and 2008. Note:
Biodiesel production costs are based on costs of energy inputs, unprocessed food as raw material
(here: rapeseed oil) and factor inputs, measured in 2003 and taken from DFT (2003), deflating
all prices by the factor input price. Price observations for rapeseed oil and crude oil are for 2003
(I), second quarter of 2007 (II) and second quarter of 2008 (III)
has an energy loss of 44%. The cost of producing biodiesel can be compared
with the prevailing energy and food prices, as represented on the I-II-III line,
for the calibration year 2003, and for the second quarters of 2007 and 2008,
when the crude oil price almost doubled.
Hence the straight line depicts the fossil fuel price above which it would
pay to produce biofuel, and the difference with the I-II-III line shows the
profitability gap that is covered by implicit subsidization.
It follows that for the second quarter of 2008 the resulting biodiesel
subsidy reaches 56 cts/l, which for a biofuel share of 3%, the current per-
centage of biofuels used for transport, amounts to a total subsidy of around
7 billion euro annually, or 5% of the 2008 EU budget of 129 billion euro. This
subsidy will in principle rise proportionately as the mandate is expanded to
5.75% in 2010 and the prospective 10% in 2020.
For comparison, current excise on diesel is 36 cts/l on average in the EU,
for a retail liter price of 145 cts/l. Hence for biodiesel an excise tax exemption
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would not close the profitability gap. For gasoline/ethanol the effect would
be more favorable as the current average excise is 50 cts/l on average, which
is about equal to the profitability gap for ethanol from wheat, according to
data in OECD (2008), Figure 1.7. A full exemption of excise could be justi-
fied if the production process for biofuels was completely CO2 neutral, and
fell under a carbon tax regime, to which we return below.
Efficiency improvements might allow for a reduction in slope and inter-
cept of the cost line. Also, within biofuels a further shift to bioethanol is
to be expected, also because use of diesel itself is to be curbed for health
and environmental reasons (EEA 2008). However, OECD-FAO (2008) fore-
casts a downward modest correction in the course of 2008–2009, followed
by a period of constantly high prices, in real terms over the next decade,
because of sustained growth in demand for meat in Asia and the Middle East,
high cost of production and transport due to high energy prices, and bio-
fuel demand itself. Under such circumstances the profitability gap will remain
large in the EU, and is more likely to widen rather than to narrow down.
4 POLICIES
In response to the massive critique in the media and political circles that bio-
fuel policies are the major cause of high food prices, the European minis-
ters for energy considered in their Council meeting of June 2008 to soften the
requirements to the extent that energy used in hydrogen or electricity driven
cars would become eligible within the renewables mandate, even when these
depend on nuclear power and coal. In addition, it was suggested that the tar-
gets themselves are likely to be revised at an appropriate occasion. Thus, the
biofuel controversy might seem to be over. Yet, we do not expect this to be
the case.
First, while the introduction and relatively fast rise in mandatory blending
targets is now widely seen as a major policy mistake, there might be argu-
ments to keep implicit subsidization of biofuels in some different form, on
the basis of a Pigovian tax argument to internalize external effects, since after
all crop production in itself, as opposed to the fossil fuel inputs it relies on
and the changes in soil conditions it may cause, does not generate net CO2-
emissions.
Second, the price hike on the food markets has pointed to a tighter
interconnection between food and energy markets, which needs to be
addressed as it can seriously hurt the poor even in developed countries and
also acts as major source of inflation.
Finally, relaxing the biofuel mandates will not prevent the use of bio-
mass for energy. Worldwide, high prices of fossil fuel directly trigger more
intensive use of firewood and crop residuals by households and industry and
through this sharpen the age-old competition for land between food and
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energy uses. Abolishment of mandatory blending cannot change this. Produc-
ing biomass for energy in an efficient and environmentally sustainable way,
therefore, remains an important priority.
This section comments on these three issues.
4.1 Carbon Tax
Long before the emergence of biofuels, proposals were made to arrive at
a carbon tax that would penalize greenhouse gas emissions, with adequate
weights on various emissions depending on their greenhouse gas effect, in fact
a regular Pigovian tax. For fuels, collecting a carbon tax would be relatively
easy and similar to existing levies on gasoline. For other kinds of emissions,
such as those from soils directly, special monitoring would be required, and
in some cases taxes can be replaced by prohibition. The carbon tax could
replace all other taxes on energy but to be effective it should be flat and
not allowed to differ between countries. If implemented adequately interna-
tionally, such taxes should penalize emissions as they come and arbiter fairly
among various types of fuel.
In practice, carbon tax rates vary widely. The San Francisco Bay area
applies a tax of 0.044 USD per ton CO2, but in Sweden it is as high as 100
USD, or 20 eurocts/l. The IPCC, in a desk study covering 100 proposals to
tax carbon, finds a similarly wide range. The EU has also been envisaging
such a system (Dorigoni and Gulli 2002), but could so far not agree on the
appropriate level of taxation. Carbon taxes at the higher end of the range,
combined with tax exemptions for biodiesel and ethanol would be required
to make biofuels a viable option in Europe. Clearly, this would reduce pub-
lic revenue by significant amounts. The implicit tax computed in Figure 1
suggests a revenue loss in the order of 7 billion euro annually.
There are also implications for trade policy. As long as carbon taxes differ,
it will be necessary for energy importing countries to apply corrective levies
that have all the appearances of import protection. This may give rise to a
host of trade disputes, especially since current WTO-regulations do not look
favorably upon such actions (Holmes et al. 2003; Goh 2004).
It is in this connection remarkable that the present mandatory minimum
blending requirements for biofuels, one of the most distortionary instruments
for international trade, seems to be acceptable for the WTO. Motaal (2008)
mentions that the WTO agenda is now primarily concerned with how to
reduce import tariffs on bioethanol and biodiesel and how to make trade fig-
ures in biofuels more transparent, which currently have no separate tariff lines
for bioethanol and biodiesel. This bypasses the large implicit subsidy to bio-
fuel producers and the important trade distortions resulting from these quan-
titative restrictions. Yet, legally, transfers qualify only as subsidies when they
are explicitly provided by government. Moreover, unlike non-tariff barriers
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the EU’s biofuel restrictions are creating trade rather than reducing it. If the
provision of blending mandates became a case in the WTO, the panel com-
mittee and the appellate body may still decide that such a policy is acceptable
when subjected to the specific formulations in the Legal Texts, which particu-
larly for agriculture were typically drafted to reduce dumping and import pro-
tection, and not to avoid exogenous upward shifts in demand.
The carbon tax is a sharpening of the existing system of trade in emission
permits, whose implementation started recently (in The Netherlands in 2005)
to effectuate the Kyoto Agreement. This trade is open to firms whose emis-
sions exceed given norms, and makes it possible for heavily polluting firms
that have no competitive alternative technology available to trade their oblig-
ations with firms that can more easily adapt, which in practice often means
foreclosure. In parallel, several technical requirements are imposed on smaller
energy users such as private cars and heating-apparatus.
Whereas actual implementation is recent, studies on the potential effects
of carbon taxes and trade in emission permits started long ago, and were
also reported on in De Economist (Smulders 1995; Heijdra and van der Ploeg
1995; Van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen 1995; Heijdra and van der Horst 2000).
From an allocation viewpoint, replacing the various excise and value added
taxes by a carbon tax would raise economic efficiency as it amounts to elimi-
nate many non-flat taxes by single pricing of previously free resource use, at a
socially optimal level. Hence, both climate and the economy would gain. This
used to be referred to as the “Double dividend” (Bovenberg 1995).
Trade in permits obviously offers advantages in terms of allocation
efficiency and leads in principle to a uniform tax equivalent, but it requires
careful monitoring of emission levels and proves to be rather vulnerable to
lobbying in this respect. Also it must be decided which part of the tax col-
lected should accrue to the public budget, and within this budget, which frac-
tion should be earmarked for spending on the sectors that contributed the
funds as opposed to say, reduction of public debt.
The carbon tax offers the advantage of uniformity but as far as the distri-
bution of the collected taxes is concerned, all the problems of how to divide
the proceeds over the owners hold, especially at international, above EU-level.
The atmosphere is obviously the most global of all commons. When consider-
ing this common resource to be owned by humanity as a collective (Dasgupta
2007), the issue becomes how individual members should benefit. Of course,
to the extent the collective needs to incur specific costs for its preservation,
these can be subtracted without attribution to individual members. Yet, an
entitlement distribution has to be agreed upon to distribute the remaining
surplus. The common rules that let the polluter enjoy a major part of the
benefits are exclusively concerned with the reduction of price distortions as
opposed to the fair distribution of collective surplus. Alternatively, surplus
distribution could provide every individual in the world with a base income.
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Those who spend less on carbon tax than they earn as base income would
derive positive net revenue from it, and vice versa for large users of fossil fuels
(UNEP 2007). In this logic, proceeds from all ecotaxes should be redistrib-
uted fairly, and therefore, generate automatic transfers accruing to the “right-
ful” owners worldwide. With resource scarcity mounting, it will become polit-
ically increasingly difficult to channel the proceeds of carbon taxes back to
polluting sectors and countries.
4.2 Food Price Stabilization
Besides a high price level on food and energy markets, the increased price
volatility on spot and futures markets requires attention. This volatility is
partly originating from factors external to the food and energy sectors them-
selves, as raw materials have regained importance within financial portfolios,
while financial markets are plagued by instabilities of various kinds. Address-
ing these imperfections requires action in the financial sphere as well as in the
macro-economic domain but interventions on food and energy markets may
be needed as well.
Large fluctuations in food prices are undesirable, for many well known rea-
sons. The poor not covered by social safety nets are affected; farmers who
cannot afford the income risk turn to less risky but on average less profitable
crops, which amounts to inefficiency; traditional farmers do this for physical
survival, commercial farmers to avoid bankruptcy, as they are more exposed
through the non-food inputs they buy; finally, the macro-economy may suffer
through the impact on wages and inflation, and the more so in poorer coun-
tries where food takes a larger fraction of consumer expenditures.
As a stabilization measure on the food markets themselves, it has been sug-
gested, e.g. by IFPRI (2008), to build up and maintain strategic food stocks
that should discourage speculation. However, experience with such stocks is
mixed. Keeping emergency reserves situated in remote areas, say, in Ethiopia
(DPPC 2004), has proved quite effective in allowing for fast food aid deliv-
ery in the wake of a disaster but past efforts with buffer stock operations that
aim to stabilize international commodity markets have been far from encour-
aging. Public stockholding is costly, the nutritive quality of the stored food
deteriorates rapidly, and stocks either get overfilled or depleted once specu-
lators become active. This experience largely dates back to the 1980s when
funds available for speculation were much smaller, speculative actions much
slower, and the share of processed foods in total much smaller. Nowadays,
most of the stocks are privately held and not registered as such, because
they reside within the commodity pipeline from farmer to consumer, and are
kept in trucks, factories and supermarkets. Hence, to affect the market very
large publicly controlled stocks would be required. These stocks would by
their physical nature be very cost ineffective as compared to holding financial
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assets, and obviously, the present situation of scarcity is not the time to build
up such large strategic stocks quickly.
In this regard, the interconnection between food and biofuel may for a
while offer new opportunities for food price stabilization. Fossil fuels are by
their very nature more easily stored than food, and oil and gas can simply
be kept in the ground. The G8 could for instance put an upper limit on the
use of biofuel in gasoline when they find that food prices rise too much. Since
the number of oil companies in the world is small, implementation would not
have to be difficult. It would surely tamper price expectations in the mar-
ket and could do without any food reserves. Eventually, as engines become
more fuel efficient, they will presumably become less tolerant to the substi-
tution between bio- and fossil fuels. Yet, if such a possible intervention were
announced at an early stage it may promote higher flexibility in design, which
is precisely what market stabilization would be served by.
4.3 Towards Efficient and Sustainable Production of Biomass for Energy
Once an adequate regulatory system of carbon taxes has been put in place,
there is no reason to object on environmental grounds to biofuels in par-
ticular, since the severity of the ecotaxes should provide adequate penaliza-
tion, nor is there any justification for promoting them through subsidies and
mandatory mixing. Then, the use of biomass in general and perhaps also
of liquid biofuels will continue, and the question becomes how to produce
this biomass around the world in a socially and environmentally sustainable
manner.
There are basically three ways to address the resulting demand pressure.
The first, specifically in relation to biofuels, would be to develop second gen-
eration technologies that can use the whole plant as opposed to the seeds or
roots only (sugar cane is already more effective in this respect). This requires
“cracking” the cellulose membranes, which, however, proves to be quite diffi-
cult, as was mentioned earlier. Alternatively, introduction of battery or hydro-
gen driven cars would make it possible to rely on non-liquid energy carriers
at the power plant or hydrogen factory. Both ways, biomass becomes the crit-
ical input rather than carbohydrates or vegetable oil. The second way, which
also applies to biomass production in general, is to reduce the needs of fertil-
izers and other inputs, as this would increase the net energy yield per hectare.
Here precision agriculture could target the individual crop, say, by coating
the seeds with plant nutrients, rather than improving the soil. This is possi-
ble with available technology but often is too costly. Finally, the third way is
to cultivate energy crops on marginal lands unsuitable for food production.
Here the estimated potentials tend to be large. A whole range of studies finds
biomass potentials of the order of magnitude of current total energy demand,
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TABLE 4 – BIOMASS POTENTIALS AND USE OF NUTRIENTS
Land Yield Energy Nutrient Total
use output application nutrients
[million ha] [GJ/ha] [EJ] kg/ha million tons
Total, World 13013 198 194
Arable land and 1562 10 16 12 18
permanent crops
Permanent meadows
and pastures 3406 35 119 40 136
Forest area 3952 16 63 10 40
Other land 4093 0 0 0 0
Source: Based on Fischer and Schrattenholzer (2001), and expert opinion for nutrient applica-
tions. Note: 1 GJ= 109 Joules, 1 EJ= 109 GJ. Output of arable land and grass land refers to a
fraction of crop residues and to energy crops, respectively. Forest output is restricted to sustain-
able practices only.
about 470 EJ (Faaij 2007; Van Dam et al. 2007). However, to effectuate these
potentials various inputs are needed in vast quantities. Table 4 gives an styl-
ized example of fertilizer needs, based on data in Fischer and Schrattenholzer
(2001).
The calculation considers three types of land use from which additional
biomass could be obtained, which totals some 200 EJ gross energy. Measur-
ing fertilizer requirements as the sum of the pure macronutrients nitrogen,
phosphate and potassium leads, under conservative assumptions, to a need of
194million tons as compared to current total use of about 160million tons.
There is no easy way out on this. For example, crop residues are needed for
soil fertilization. Using them as feedstock for energy production affects the
productive capacity of land, reduces soil cover and increases erosion hazards
(USDA/NCRS 2006). The danger of land degradation is even more severe for
grasses, when the entire standing biomass is harvested year after year. Simi-
larly, perennial plants, such as the Jatropha shrub that has gained popularity
in arid zones where it can produce vegetable oil under harsh conditions on
poor soils, need fertilizer at the very least to compensate for the nutrients lost
through harvesting but also to raise yields.
Supplying fertilizers in such quantities will be difficult. Nitrogen is to
be captured from the atmosphere through an energy intensive process that
should not rely on fossil fuels to be CO2-effective, and could greatly reduce
the net energy yield when biomass based. Potassium and phosphate are to
be extracted from rock types that have become relatively scarce already and
are hard to recycle, while the best quality deposits tend to run out (Steen
1998). Phosphate rock has a ratio of proven reserves to current consump-
tion of about 120 years, and for potash the ratio is twice that large. Yet,
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large parts of the phosphate reserves, especially those in China, are expected
to be of low grade (USGS 2008), and to be significantly contaminated by
cadmium and uranium and hence by heavy metals and radioactivity that
one would not like to see accumulate in soils, let alone in living organisms
(CMA 2008).
Furthermore, beyond the macronutrients, a variety of micronutrients, such
as zinc will be required as well on specific soil types. Some of these nutrients
are even scarcer, with proven reserves of zinc as low as 22 years of current
consumption. Recyling of zinc is possible, but demand from industry is soar-
ing as well, and soils in large parts of the world are zinc deficient (Nube´ and
Voortman 2008). Also other micronutrients (boron, copper, manganese) have
ratios in the range of 30–40 years. Geological surveys indicate that most if not
all nutrients have a much larger reserve base, but very little is known as to the
quality of the ores and the cost of exploitation.
Hence, scarcity of plant nutrients may become a serious issue that is except
for nitrogen, possibly even more pressing than for energy, because there is
no substitute such as solar of nuclear ahead. Nutrients of mineral origin
that have washed into the oceans are virtually lost forever. The badly needed
intensification of agricultural production, particularly in Subsaharan Africa,
will heavily depend on availability of plant nutrients also. Furthermore, the
marginal lands on which biomass is to be grown for non-food uses, are likely
to require more intensive applications than Table 4 suggests. One way is
the precision agriculture mentioned earlier that can greatly reduce needs, but
is hard to apply under technologically less advanced conditions. The other
option, particularly relevant for energy crops, is to recover the main nutrients
at the processing plant, mainly from the process residues, such as ashes. The
difficulty is to return these in appropriate proportions to the land of origin.
In short, the EU, the US and other countries may have formulated ambi-
tious targets for biofuel use and the agro-ecological potentials may be large
but it is by no means clear where this fuel is to come from and how to pro-
duce it in a socially and environmentally sustainable way.
While large-scale production of biomass for energy purposes clearly has
consequences for input use, in rural areas biofuels from crops, manure and
farm residues could, under adequate soil fertility and water management,
offer valuable savings on input costs for farmers. For instance, Jatropha
cultivated on marginal lands may help save on fossil fuel purchases, and even-
tually, commercial sales to local markets may even become possible. This
will be a welcome source of additional employment, since it is more prof-
itable to perform fuel extraction locally, given the bulky nature of the raw
material, the exclusive interest in the carbohydrate components of the bio-
fuel crop, and the need to return all plant nutrients contained in it to the
soil.
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Scaling up these production systems to make them an export industry will
meet with various constraints. The rising demand for scarce nutrients has
been mentioned already, and the introduction of new plantations may require
clearing and preparation of land, which may cause significant greenhouse
gas emissions, particularly on peat soils (Fargione et al. 2008). In addition,
various countries have stated that biofuels need to meet certain sustainabil-
ity criteria to become eligible for import, which beyond environmental sus-
tainability also cover labor conditions on plantations. Associated to these
concerns there is also the question what to do about price fluctuations, par-
ticularly for fossil fuels whose prices tend to fall almost as fast as they rise.
Plantations in marginal and sub-marginal areas are especially vulnerable to
price fluctuations, as well as to changes in the policies such as the strengthen-
ing of sustainability criteria, because they will often lack the common fallback
strategy of returning to subsistence cultivation on household plots. More-
over, workers on such remote settlements are not likely to have many other
cash crops or job opportunities to opt for. Hence, special safeguards will be
required in the contracts between workers and employers at the plantation
itself, as well as between the plantation and its customers downstream, to
maintain a minimum level of social security. For biofuels, various proposals
have been issued in the EU recently to arrive at social as well as environmen-
tal labeling of imported products. Social security provisions could be made
part of these.
High energy prices and the scaling up of biomass production not only
affects plantations. They are also the driving force of encroachment into
areas currently characterized by low productivity: shrub land, jungles, forests,
tundra’s and steppes, which cover more than three quarters of the Earth’s
land mass. By their very nature, such areas are characterized by lack of
control and law enforcement to protect environment and population. Fur-
thermore, the property rights over these surfaces are poorly established, and
often attributed by default to central government. Various countries are cur-
rently handing out concessions for large-scale biofuel plantations but with-
out being able or willing to impose the necessary safeguards for social and
environmental sustainability. Thus, all ingredients for conflicts and tragedies
of the commons seem to be present, and governance aspects need urgent
attention.
5 CONCLUSION
About a decade ago, biofuels appeared on the scene as an ideal way to
reduce greenhouse gases, to contribute to energy self-sufficiency and to cre-
ate additional demand for agricultural commodities suffering from depressed
prices. In response, developed countries enthusiastically introduced manda-
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tory blending requirements and lavish subsidies, to spur fast adoption of this
technology, and proved all too successful in their endeavor. The net savings
on fossil fuels have been disappointing because of the high fossil fuel intensity
of agricultural inputs, processing and transport, and the completely inelastic
shift in demand, caused by the blending requirements, bears a significant part
of the responsibility for the present food crisis.
Therefore, the controversy that arose around biofuels is understandable
and highly relevant. It has been instrumental in toning down the unre-
alistic policy ambitions in this domain, particularly within the EU. How-
ever, this backtracking does not resolve the underlying issue that rising
scarcity of fossil fuels will accentuate the competition for land, fertilizers, and
labor between food and energy crops, and put nature under additional pres-
sure.
In policy terms, this defines three major tasks. The first is replacing the
current excise taxes on energy carriers by a uniform carbon tax, so as to mit-
igate greenhouse gas emissions in an efficient manner. Under a carbon tax,
biofuels, unlike the fossil fuels needed to produce them, would qualify for
a tax exemption, which obviously would imply a significant loss in tax rev-
enue for the countries concerned. There is a strong need for serious debate
on the optimal taxation of biofuels, and energy in general, and preferably also
on how to distribute carbon tax revenues among the “owners” of the object
of taxation, i.e. the global atmosphere. In Europe, a biofuel tax exemption
would presumably be insufficient to make biofuel production profitable, but
this depends on the relative prices of food and fuel and on progress in the
technology of biofuel production.
A second task is to prevent price fluctuations on the oil markets from
destabilizing food markets, as happened in recent years. Rather than building
up strategic food stocks that would always be vulnerable to speculation, intro-
duction of caps on the use of food for biofuel could prove effective here. Yet,
soon the emphasis will have to shift from food crop based biofuels to biomass
based energy production, largely in developing countries on lands less suitable
for food production.
A third, much wider task is, therefore, to make such a transition possi-
ble and sustainable, technically as well as institutionally. Technically, on these
previously scarcely populated lands the task would be to safeguard biodiver-
sity and soil fertility, taking into account the mounting scarcity of minerals
needed for fertilizer production, for which no substitutes are known and for
which recycling can be quite difficult. Institutionally, the task is to distribute
new concessions equitably, to protect the property and user rights of the lands
where energy crops are to be grown, and to maintain adequate labor stan-
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dards and living conditions on these plantations, particularly under adversi-
ties after crop failures and unfavorable price movements.
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